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In this study, we investigate the nexus between career risk aversion and unemployment duration 
based on German survey data (GSOEP). Using a direct measurement of career risk aversion, we do 
not find a statistically significant linear effect from risk aversion on unemployment duration. However, 
we find significant effects when controlling for a non-linear or time varying correlation between risk 
aversion and unemployment duration. Our results show that risk aversion is important when deciding 
when to leave unemployment. This research takes into account the high complexity involved in how 
risk aversion enters an individual’s decision process during a job search. 
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1 Introduction 
In economics, it is well known that risk aversion might have an influence on economic 
decisions, as has been found, for instance, in the field of occupational choice, human capital 
and investment behavior (e.g. Levhari and Weiss 1974, Bonin et al. 2007, Belzil and 
Leonardi 2007, Pfeifer 2008a and 2008b). Despite this line of research, little is still known 
about the way risk aversion affects labor supply. One such situation is the job search, where 
the individual has to decide when to stop searching and accept a job offer. Information about 
the dispersion of risk aversion and the nexus to unemployment duration is substantially 
necessary for an efficient organization of unemployment insurance systems (Acemoglu and 
Shimer 1999).
2  
Job search theory implies that risk aversion leads to lower reservation wages and therefore 
quicker job acceptance. Subsequently, this should cause shorter job search periods and 
durations in unemployment (Pissarides 1974). However, the challenging part in studying the 
effect of risk aversion in affecting the duration of unemployment is that it can be different and 
complex in nature (e.g., Schoemaker 1993). 
Previous research on the importance of risk aversion in job search has mainly focused on 
reservation wages, while the effect of risk aversion on unemployment duration has been 
addressed in only a few studies. Empirical research shows that risk aversion tends to lower 
the reservation wage (Pannenberg 2010) and may tend to cause shorter unemployment 
durations (Feinberg 1977) while Diaz-Serrano and O’Neill (2004) find that more risk averse 
people are more often unemployed. Pfeifer (2008a) shows that risk aversion affects labor 
market outcomes in general, focusing on several outcomes (e.g., job change, type of 
contract, on-the-job-training). Furthermore, experimental research supports these findings. 
Cox and Oaxaca (1989), for example, find risk averse people to stop searching earlier than 
risk neutral people, which is in line with the general expectations. However, Schunk and 
Winter (2007) find no evidence for the importance of risk aversion in affecting unemployment 
durations while their results provide support for the thesis of the relevance of loss aversion in 
the job search process. 
                                                  
2 The argumentation in Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) follows the idea of that risk aversion causes a level of 
productivity below efficiency due to sub-optimal investment strategies. The presence of unemployment 
insurance may help solving this problem by making risk averse people open for risky jobs (having a higher 
productivity) and therefore allowing optimal investment in capital in the economy. Furthermore, risk aversion 
has been underreported in evaluation studies, which may evoke concerns when it shows up to be substantive 
in the search process. Finally, information about the importance of risk aversion may also help in terms of 
improving subsequent counseling in the active labor market policy and related job placement activities.   2
Our study contributes to this strand of research and provides more detailed evidence on the 
relevance of risk aversion on unemployment duration. In particular, we extend previous 
research by using a context specific measure of risk aversion instead of using a generalized 
question on risk aversion or related approximations. And, we investigate the existence of a 
linear and time constant effect of risk aversion on the search process. In this direction our 
study also contributes to the discussion of whether the effect of risk aversion on job search 
refers to a strictly monotonic risk aversion in job search or not. 
The empirical part of our study is conducted based on the German Socioeconomic Panel 
(GSOEP), which extensively asks for risk attitudes in the survey of 2004. In order to account 
for an underlying time-dependent nature of unemployment hazards, as well as right 
censoring, we use duration models that measure the influence of risk aversion on the time 
spent in unemployment. In studying the time-variant nature of the correlation between risk 
aversion and search duration we apply the cumulative Aalen hazard estimator as suggested 
by Hosmer and Royston (2002). We also consider many control variables in our modeling 
framework that have been suggested to be correlated with unemployment and risk aversion. 
Finally, we restrict the data in our analysis in order to account for potential endogenous 
correlations between unemployment propensity and risk aversion. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Chapter Two considers theoretical 
reflections on the relationship between risk aversion and unemployment duration and reports 
previous empirical findings. Chapter Three provides information on the data set and 
measurement of the relevant attributes. Results of the empirical investigation are presented 
in Chapter Four. Finally, Chapter Five summarizes and discusses our findings and gives a 
brief outlook on the implications of further research. 
 
2 Relationship between risk aversion and unemployment duration 
 
2.1 Theoretical considerations 
Search theory considers unemployment duration as a searching process where job offers are 
received at a constant rate and where individuals sequentially search for a new job (see 
Mortensen 1970 and McCall 1970 for details of the basic framework). A person looking for a 
job is confronted with a specific and known distribution of potential incomes. Variance of the 
income offers result from asymmetric information and different matching qualities. Usually, in 
search theory, the income distribution is taken as given and might be thought of as an a priori 
distribution that is revised while searching proceeds. The distribution properties allow for 
deriving expectancies concerning the possible income available to the job searcher, which   3
shows up as an expected value for the individual. The costs of search are referring e.g. to 
the foregone income during the searching process. 
The individual’s choice whether to accept a job offer depends on the reservation wage w*, 
which the individual sets after considering search costs and the expected benefits of 
continuing search activities. The individual decides to accept a job offer (w) if this is at least 
as high as the reservation wage: 
 
* w w ¡Ý .  (1) 
 
Several extensions of this simple model have been suggested that also include variance in 
search intensities (Burdett 1978), insecure information about the wage offer distribution 
(Burdett and Wishwanath 1984), endogenous job offers and non-stationarity in job search 
(van den Berg 1990). However, little attention has been spent on the role of risk aversion in 
the utility function affecting the search process.  
Risk aversion is thought of as a concept where a person chooses safe options, rather than 
alternatives with probably higher but riskier rewards. In the context of job search this means 
that individuals will not only include the search costs and the benefit of further search in their 
choice to continue search activities but also account for the expected dispersion of job offers 
(riskiness). For example, in the case of risk aversion, one may think of individuals who (when 
highly risk averse) systematically depreciate later job offers and thus associate these jobs 
with a lower utility (for related empirical evidence see, for instance, Hartog and Vijverberg 
2007). Alternatively, we may also think of a discount for job offers associated with a higher 
uncertainty (e.g., Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970).  
The general idea behind these illustrations emphasizes that the expected value and the 
related expected utility deviates for non-risk-neutral individuals (von Neumann and 
Morgenstern 1944). In this concept - as referred to as the expected utility theory – individuals 
are assumed to react sensitive on the riskiness of a reward while the importance of the 
riskiness for the choice between different options is defined in terms of a risk premium that 
compensates - in relation to the risk neutral situation - the lower (higher) utility in case of a 
(secure) riskier option.  
Pissarides (1974) explicitly accounts for this conception of risk aversion in the job search, 
where he integrates the risk premium argument in the framework of job search activities.
 3 In 
this case expression (1) changes to: 
                                                  
3 It is important to remind the reader of numerous criticisms in economics and psychology concerning the practical 
relevance of expected utility theory, resulting in numerous proposals comprised in non-expected utility theory. 
For an overview see Starmer 2000. Even though we follow the idea suggested by Pissarides (1974) as it is (to   4
 
*
risk w p - ) w ( E ) w ( EU = ¡Ý  (2) 
and where 




risk = . (3) 
 
As can be seen in Equation (2), the difference between expected utility EU(w) and expected 
value E(w) caused by risk aversion gets smaller as the absolute value of the risk premium p 
decreases. In the case of risk neutrality, the risk premium is zero and the left hand term in 
Equation (3) equals the risk neutral reservation wage on the right hand side; with p being 
positive, risk aversion must be compensated. In this case the reservation wage set by the 
individual decreases by the amount of p (see Equation (3)) and he or she is prepared to 
accept a job more quickly. Following this idea we should expect that the unemployment 
duration will be shortened in case of increased risk aversion. However, the specific form of 
how  p affects the reservation wage and in consequence the search process is left 
unspecified.  
With focus on the effect of risk aversion on the duration spent in job search we are 
concerned with the following interrelation: 
 
search w p riskiness
* Δ ￿¨ Δ ￿¨ Δ = Δ  (4) 
 
For instance in a linear interrelation we would assume that a certain difference of risk 
aversion (Δriskiness) between individuals always causes a homogenous change on search 
duration (Δsearch) – independent of the level of risk aversion and of the time already spent 
for searching. Given that (Δsearch) adequately corresponds to the individual’s change of 
wealth due to job search our assumption implies a utility function with constant risk aversion. 
Traditionally, economic theory usually assumes monotonic risk aversion in wealth. However, 
in this study we especially doubt the existence of such a related monotonic and time invariant 
interrelation between risk aversion and the stopping rule in the search process. 
 
2.2 Empirical studies and research outline 
Empirical evidence on job search theory is fairly broad and extensive (see for an overview 
Eckstein and van den Berg 2007) and recent contributions to this field of research also 
include experimental designs that also address issues suggested by behavioral economics 
                                                                                                                                                      
our best knowledge) the only framework which allows considering decisions under uncertainty or riskiness in 
the job search process.   5
(e.g., Cox and Oaxaca 2008, Schunk and Winter 2007). However, empirical research that 
contributes to the issues of risk aversion in the context of job search are rare. In fact, there is 
only one study testing the influence of risk aversion on the duration of unemployment directly 
(Feinberg 1977), while other studies test the influence of risk aversion on the arrival of 
unemployment (Diaz-Serrano and O’Neill 2004) or on changes of the reservation wage 
(Pannenberg 2010). Even though, all of these studies base their theoretical argumentation 
on search theory.  
Using a duration model in the reduced form approach, Feinberg (1977) finds unemployment 
duration to be shortened with higher risk aversion. Unfortunately, the data set used by 
Feinberg does not contain a direct risk measure but instead builds on an index considering 
behavior in different risky situations, such as having insurance on cars.  
Cox and Oaxaca (2008) find in their empirical experiments that risk averse people stop 
searching earlier, than risk neutral people, as proposed by job search theory. Schunk and 
Winter (2007) are interested in the reason for the earlier stopping of job search than 
proposed by standard job search theory by many people. They proposed two different 
explanations. One of them is the existence of risk aversion, while the other focuses on the 
existence of limited cognitive processing capacities. However, in their investigation they do 
not find evidence for risk aversion, but for loss aversion (Kahnemann and Tversky 1979).  
Diaz-Serrano and O’Neill (2004) test the interrelation of risk aversion and the occurrence of 
unemployment using a logit model. The data set used by the authors contains a question 
about risk aversion modeled as a lottery game. The authors use the answers to build an 
Arrow Pratt absolute risk measure. Surprisingly, they find that more risk-averse people tend 
to be unemployed more often. However, the state of unemployment does not say anything 
about the duration of unemployment. Nevertheless, the results indicate that people who are 
more risk averse tend to self-select into safer jobs. 
Pannenberg (2010) tests the influence of risk aversion on the value of reservation wages. He 
uses a fixed effects panel model to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Using GSOEP 
data, he is restricted to the general risk question, the only one asked at two points in time. 
Pannenberg finds a negative correlation between risk aversion and reservation wages, as 
predicted by search theory.  
Pfeifer (2008a and 2008b) focuses more broadly on risk aversion and studies the correlation 
between risk aversion and several labor market outcomes. For instance, he finds that risk 
aversion is correlated with the type of contract, job changes, on-the-job-training and the type 
of occupation. Furthermore, he points to the importance of using context specific risk 
measurements instead of a general indicator.   6
Concluding these findings, most studies confirm the implications set by search theory: risk 
aversion leads to a lower reservation wage and, followed by this, shorter unemployment 
durations. Following the concept suggested by Pissarides (1974) the major nexus between 
risk aversion and job search periods will thus operate due to the individual’s utility function 
while previous findings provide support for a constant or at least a monotonic risk aversion in 
job search. However, recent critique has raised concerns with this idea (e.g., prospect 
theory; Kahnemann and Tversky 1979). In the basic setting prospect theory assumes that 
the utility is a composition of two distinct steps in the individual’s decision process that adds 
a value-link and a weighting function to the specific outcome. 
In accordance with the findings of Schunk and Winter (2007) risk aversion as it is usually 
understood or measured may be more likely to operate as or due to channels of loss 
aversion. If so, individuals differ in their valuation of losing and holding options (given 
identical option values). In our case this provides support for the idea of a more complex 
nexus between utility and risk aversion in job search because giving up a specific job option 
in order to continue search for better options is a typically issue in job search. 
 
3 Data and Measurements 
Our analysis is based on the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), a representative 
sample of the German population, yearly inquired since 1984 (Wagner et al. 2008).
4 The 
questions about risk aversion are not regularly asked in the panel and are presented only in 
2004 and 2006 while in 2004 this is also combined with a very detailed battery of items. In 
addition to a lottery question, there are additional questions asking for a direct estimate of the 
person’s risk aversion, so that the data includes a generalized risk measurement and a set of 
context-specific measures.
5 Because we are especially interested in risk aversion in 
occupational surroundings, we focus on the career specific attribute. For the generalized 
measurement of the individual’s risk aversion, the GSOEP asks whether people think of 
themselves as being more or less risk averse in general. The answer can be given based on 
eleven response categories with the lowest value marking the highest risk aversion. The 
same scale is used to identify context specific risk aversion. Furthermore, as suggested in 
other empirical research on job search we define job search duration in terms of the time 
spent in unemployment. 
 
                                                  
4 For detailed information see http://www.diw.de/en/soep . 
5 The general question in the GSOEP 2004: „People can behave differently in different situations- How would your 
rate your willingness to take risks in your occupation career?” (0: risk-averse, 10: fully prepared to take risks).   7
3.1 Measurement of risk aversion 
In the first step we are concerned with finding an adequate identification for risk aversion as it 
is referred to as p in the theoretical discussion. When deciding for a risk measurement, one 
should keep in mind the controversial interdisciplinary discussion on the possibility of 
measuring risk aversion. First, there is the question of the meaning of risk aversion. Is there 
a personal disposition for risk or is risk aversion a context specific construct? Actual results 
show that it seems to be a person specific disposition that is independent of different 
contexts even though the different contexts seem to give an additional explanation for the 
individual’s behavior (Dohmen et al. 2009, Krahnen et al. 1997) when examining questions in 
these contexts. 
 
Figure 1: Dispersion of risk aversion 
about here 
 
We take the actual results into consideration and make use of the context specific risk 
measure (see also Pfeifer 2008b). Comparing this one with the general risk question shows 
considerable differences in our data set (see Figure 1). Most people (n=259) think of 
themselves as being more risk averse in general than in career specific matters (general 
minus specific). The histogram below shows the difference of generalized risk aversion and 
career specific risk aversion. 
A further point is controversially discussed, especially between psychologists and 
economists. In a traditional fashion, economists usually believe in constant preferences as 
they also believe in a non-changing risk aversion over time. Psychologists, in contrast, 
believe that risk aversion is, in general, able to alter with time or within different contexts and 
situations. Sahm (2007) for example finds that risk tolerance is sensitive to external changes 
like aging and changes in macroeconomic conditions while the disposition to take risk is 
relatively constant and tends to persist in terms of systematic individual differences. 
However, Pannenberg (2010) reports variance of risk aversion over time for the general 
measurement of risk aversion at the individual level within a two-year period.  
The third point is a methodological question of how to measure risk aversion. The question 
here is whether people are able to estimate their risk aversion in practical situations when 
asked an abstract question. For instance, people might have difficulties in imagining their 
reactions in real situations and sorting their degree of risk aversion. In such cases, 
measuring the individual’s stated risk aversion might depend on the degree of risk aversion 
itself. We will account for this and conduct extra investigations that use different 
standardizations, which we include in our robustness checks. Nevertheless, the questions on   8
risk aversion asked in the GSOEP have been tested in their relevance for real actions 
(Dohmen et al. 2009), which reveals robustness, reliability and validity in the used 
instruments in an experimental setting. Thought related answers can be treated as adequate 
measures of the individual’s risk aversion. 
 
3.2 Measurement of unemployment duration 
In our sample, we concentrated on individuals employed in 2004 - meaning that all persons 
had a 12-month employment period in that year. Furthermore, we also included only persons 
who answered the question on risk aversion and who experienced unemployment afterward. 
Both restrictions are very important because they account for the potential problem of 
endogenous correlation and allow us to focus on individuals who are likely to receive job 
offers, as is presumed by job search theory (job offer rate is unequal to zero). Finally, we 
restrict our sample to people between 22 and 62 years of age to focus on the labor force 
population.  
Measuring risk aversion in the 2004 data, our unemployment spells start in 2005. In the data, 
we are able to observe these unemployment spells up to the end of 2007 - allowing for an 
observation period of 36 months. Our measurement of unemployment duration depends on a 
retrospective question that asks for the employment status of each month in the previous 
year. This monthly information is transferred to an un-interrupted unemployment episode. 
Doing so, we have 543 unemployment observations (472 observations with multivariate non-




3.3 Control variables 
In measuring the influence of risk aversion on unemployment duration, we considered a 
broad set of control variables:  
 
Personal characteristics:  
First, there are personal characteristics influencing unemployment duration and, as different 
studies show, also risk aversion.  
                                                  
6 Most individuals are observed only once with a period of unemployment. However, we also find some of the 
people to be unemployed twice or more often. In our analysis, we allowed these individuals to be at risk as 
often as they re-entered unemployment.   9
- For example, several studies show an increasing risk aversion with age, which seems to be 
especially the case from 40 years onward (Dohmen et al. 2005, Harrison et al. 2007). 
Studies examining the influence of sex on risk aversion report strong gender differences 
(Eckel and Grossman 2008, Barsky et al. 1997, Dohmen et al. 2005). This is also 
supported by research on self-employment (e.g. Wagner 2007). Likewise, gender 
differences and age specific patterns are found in job search behavior and the 
acceptance of job offers (e.g. Bellmann and Brussig 2006) 
- In addition to age and sex, we include in our model the presence of children. The motivation 
is that the individual’s disposition to have children might reflect his risk aversion, while 
having children also directly influences the individual’s search effort and acceptance 
probability (e.g. due to restrictions in terms of regional job mobility or the necessity of a 
regular income). With a similar background, we also control for the existence of a 
(married) partner because a partner might provide financial security and allows for longer 
job searches. 
 
Human Capital attributes: 
To control for the individuals human capital, we use schooling and qualification attributes. 
Following previous findings we focus on the most important factor for success in job search 
in Germany which is the presence of examined apprenticeship training. Furthermore, we also 
include an income specific characteristic and information on employment history. The idea 
here is that human capital attributes have been proven to have a substantial impact on an 
individual’s job search, the related job offer rate and the setting of the individual’s reservation 
wage. In addition, there are also studies that indicate that risk aversion and the production of 
human capital are not independent (e.g. Guiso and Paiella 2005; Levhari and Weiss 1974). 
 
Contextual characteristics:  
Beside individual characteristics, we are convinced that it is important to control for 
contextual conditions. For instance, individuals may choose specific occupations, industries 
or firm sizes as an aspect of expected job security, while contextual characteristics may also 
correlate with variance in the job offer rate. Therefore, we include the mean of the related 
attributes: 
- Strong evidence exists for an interrelation between risk aversion and occupational choice. 
For instance, Guiso and Paiella (2005), Buurman et al. (2009), Pfeifer (2008b) and Bonin 
et al. (2007) find more risk-averse people to sort more often into the public sector. We, 
therefore control for sector and job (type of occupation) specific information. In particular, 
we include the security given by different jobs by the mean of their number of yearly   10
unemployed. Safer jobs (like those of the public sector) have a lower occupational 
dynamic and the employees should be found less often in unemployment. Aside from 
different occupations, we also consider different industries. 
- Another criterion for the security of a job is the size of the firm (number of employees) the 
person is employed in. As empirical findings suggest, instability and the likelihood of 
permanent job separations are higher in smaller firms (Kölling, 2009, Mayo and Murray 
1991). Assuming that risk averse people are mainly concerned with job loss and that the 
firm’s elasticity in employment dynamics on economic changes interplays with the size of 
the firm, we use the size of the firm as a proxy for the insurance strategy against job loss.  
 
Other characteristics: 
- To measure the readiness to adapt to the circumstances of a potential job search, we also 
controlled for the readiness to accept a wage loss to re-enter wage work. This measure is 
based on a question that refers to a hypothetical situation of unemployment and the 
hypothetical wage desired to accept a job offer. We link this reservation wage to current 
income to construct our measure. 
- We further think that the degree to which a household worries about further economic 
development proxies further determines the individual’s search activities and correlates 
with risk aversion. We use this measure as an additional catch all attribute for a further 
reduction in unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
4 Empirical analysis 
4.1 Descriptive analyses 
 
As displayed in Figure 2(c), the hazard function appears as expected. The likelihood of 
becoming unemployed first increases up to the 6
th month of observation and then declines. 
After a period of 22-24 months, a second peak appears that indicates the final end of 
unemployment benefits. This is a picture also found in other studies. Collier (2005), for 
instance, reports an almost identical duration density distribution using UK data. A similar 
pattern in the hazard function is also reported in Biewen and Wilke 2005, Addison and 
Portugal (2003) and Fahrmeier et al. (2000), while Heining and Lingens (2006) observe a 
distribution that is more likely to follow a sickle-shaped pattern without a second peak, using 
data from the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB). 
Even though other studies find a similar pattern, we checked whether the second peak might 
be caused by data issues rather than by exits from the data pool. For example, this might be   11
the case due to panel mortality. However, if panel mortality differs across risk aversion and 
the likelihood of employment, we would see this in different densities of the measured 
durations (see Figure 2 (a) and (b)). In both cases, the properties of the distributions are 
almost equal. This indicates that differences in censoring are not responsible for the second 
peak point. 
 
Figure 2: hazard distribution across time 
about here 
 
Illustration (d) of Figure 2 finally shows the cumulative hazard functions differentiated by 
levels of risk aversion. The 11 categories of risk aversion are aggregated into five categories 
to make the picture clearer. The graph shows a similar pattern for all categories until the 15
th 
month and remarkable differences afterward. However, there is no clear connection with risk 
aversion. People having the lowest risk aversion are found to have fewer exits. Because this 
difference is not relevant before the 15
th month, risk aversion can be thought of as having a 
different influence depending on the time spent in unemployment. For instance, it might be 
the case that risk averse people lower their search intensity or - following the theoretical 
discussion earlier - that risk aversion captures issues related to loss aversion. In the latter 
case giving up secure options in order to continue job search is more costly for those who 
report high levels of risk aversion. Furthermore, we also find that people observed with the 
second highest level of risk aversion have the highest cumulative hazard function from the 
20
th month onward which points to the presence of non-linearity in the correlation between 
risk aversion and unemployment duration. 
 
4.2 Econometric model and estimation results 
 
In our econometric setting, we focus on modeling the duration of unemployment, or 
alternatively, becoming employed in a given time interval as a function of a set of covariates 
while we concentrate on covariance with risk aversion. Because the shape of the underlying 
hazard function is somewhat specific, we tried different parametric and semi-parametric 
modeling approaches to fit the observed shape of the hazard function. We did so because 
the results of the duration and hazard rate models are known to be sensitive to the general 
modeling framework (e.g. see van den Berg 2001). We started by trying different hazard rate 
models, followed by different accelerated failure time (AFT) models, which are better able to 
fit the curve of the function described above. The two types of modeling approaches differ 
especially in the way they model duration dependence. While hazard models formulate the   12
event of interest in a time depending risk of occurrence framework, AFT models focus on 
modeling the duration itself.  
In more detail, hazard rate models measure the probability of leaving a state at t having 
remained in the state up to t. Therefore, hazard rates can be understood as local transition 
rates at the end of a certain time interval (Δt) given that these individuals are at risk at the 
beginning of that time interval. This is equivalent to the following expression: 
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where F(t) (F’(t) = (t)) is the cumulative density distribution of the unemployment duration, 
with t as an indicator of duration, and S(t) = 1-F(t) as the corresponding survival function. h0, 
as the baseline hazard function, may be modeled by any functional form. x represents a set 
of covariates that we allow to be correlated with the hazard rate and the β are the associated 
estimates for the magnitude of this correlation. In the corresponding failure time metric, the 
hazard of leaving a particular state is described in terms of the log duration until the hazard 
occurs. The function above can be transformed into the corresponding failure time metric: 
 
ε + β + β = τ 0 x ' x ) ln(  
 
in which the log duration ln() is described as the linear function of a set of covariates x. The 
error term, ε, captures the distribution properties of the underlying ‘baseline’ hazard function. 
In contrast to hazard functions, the log-time metric focuses on scaling the expected duration 
while the hazard function describes the effect of the covariates in terms of shifting the hazard 
rate. 
For the basic modeling framework we tested the sensitivity of different parameterizations 
using discrete and continuous time models. Furthermore, we also tested flexible approaches 
to handle state dependency by using spline smoothed hazard functions (Royston 2001) and 
we allowed for different types of frailty (gamma distributed and mass-point; see Jenkins 
1997). However, our evaluation of the statistical modeling shows that despite the different 
model specifications, our results remain rather stable and unobserved heterogeneity shows 
up to be statistically insignificant. Our interpretation of this finding is that averaging out 
specific distribution properties does not harm the estimates we are interested in.  
For descriptive purposes the results of our basic modeling approaches are displayed in Table 
1 (model A). Note that all reported estimations base on the AFT metric and use a gamma-  13
distributed parameterization of the baseline function. As can be seen, the coefficient of risk 
aversion shows the expected direction, which indicates that hazards from unemployment 
increase with risk aversion (alternatively: expected durations are accelerated). However, as 
reported in the table the estimate of the coefficient does not reveal a significant effect from 
career risk aversion on unemployment duration.  
Since we tested different specifications of our basic modeling approach, we may treat our 
finding to be final, meaning that risk aversion and unemployment duration seem to be 
uncorrelated. However, in the related modeling framework, we implicitly make the 
assumptions that a) risk aversion is affecting the duration of unemployment in a linear and 
monotone way and b) that it does not change its effect over time. Both assumptions implicitly 
refer to the concept of a linear relation between risk aversion and unemployment duration. To 
check the accuracy of these assumptions we conduct different supplemental analyses. 
 
Major findings 
a) Non-linearity hypothesis 
Our first analysis in testing the presence of a non-constant effect of risk premium focuses on 
the idea that risk aversion may influence unemployment in a non-linear way. In fact, there is 
no natural reason to think of a linear correlation between risk aversion and unemployment 
duration. In particular, in our opinion accounting for a non-linear interrelation between risk 
aversion and search duration may refer to the presence of a non-linear margin of changes in 
p. To deal with this issue, we test three different models - see Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Models considering risk aversion in a non-linear way 
about here 
 
We first conduct a model based on a set of dummy variables with risk aversion being 
measured in five categories (see model B).
7 This is the most flexible approach in handling 
state dependency and can be used to identify potential functional forms of the underlying 
correlations. As it can be seen in Table 1 the estimation results indicate a positive effect for 
the higher categories compared to risk category two. However, the estimates referring to a 
categorized measurement strongly depend on the definition of the reference category - in our 
case, category two, which includes risk values 2 and 3 (see for the definition footnote 5). 
Focusing on the magnitudes of the displayed coefficients shows that the effect of risk 
                                                  
7 Category 1 = risk values 0 to 2; category 2 = risk values 3 and 4; category 4 = risk values 5 to 8; category 5 = 
risk aversion values 9 and 10.   14
aversion tends to increase with the distance to the reference group. This provides support for 
the non-linear relationship between risk aversion and the acceleration of unemployment 
duration. 
Finally, models C and D in row three and four directly address a specific pattern of the 
underlying non-linear correlation, testing cubic and squared forms of the correlation. With 
respect to the results in Table 1, our findings mainly provide support for the superiority of the 
specification that includes a squared term of risk aversion in affecting the hazard from 
unemployment. This is evidence for a one-point inflexion pattern in the level of risk aversion 
in determining unemployment duration (u-shaped; inversely u-shaped if we focus on the 
hazard metric) – which is supported by a Sasabuchi test (P>|t| = 0.024) with an inflexion of 
the corresponding correlation at a risk value around 4.6.  
 
b) Time-dependence hypothesis 
In the second part of the empirical analysis we concentrate on a time-dependency pattern in 
the correlation between risk aversion and the duration of unemployment. Two theoretical 
reasons motivate this procedure. First, we may think that the risk premium interacts with the 
level of information. In this case we would expect that risk aversion simply starts to interplay 
with the individual’s utility function when the mean job search time starts to run off and initial 
information has been collected. Second, we focus on a potential nexus between the measure 
of risk aversion and loss aversion (see Kahnemann and Tversky 1979; Schunk and Winter 
2007). Here, we may expect that acceptable jobs are found only after an initial period of 
searching (e.g., due to learning) and that continuing searching for better jobs will cause a 
relative decrease in the individual’s utility which follows a jumping slope across time. 
 




To make time variation visible, we use a graphical assessment of the time variation of the 
coefficient using the Aalen additive hazard model (Aalen 1989; Hosmer and Royston 2002). 
With this method, it is possible to estimate time varying effects by allowing the coefficients to 
be additively associated with the baseline function.
8 Given the cumulative Aalen estimator, 
                                                  
8 PH models in contrast associate the coefficient’s multiplicatively to the baseline, in which time dependence is 
modeled. It follows that the coefficients behave proportionally to the baseline and are forced to be constant in 
time. For a more detailed discussion, see Hosmer and Royston (2002).   15
time variation of the coefficient is displayed by plotting the time varying coefficient against 
time, where the magnitude of the effect in a certain interval refers to the slope of the graph 
and where effects are reported in terms of the hazard metric.  
As the first picture in Figure 3 shows, there is no support for a constant effect of career risk 
aversion on the hazard of unemployment with time in general. A constant effect can be found 
only piecewise for the first eight months and for the period between 18 and 21 months while 
risk aversion seems to be uncorrelated with unemployment hazards in the periods between 
the 8
th and 18
th month and beyond the 21
st month. 
To test the statistical relevance of these graphical signs, we use a model specification (see 
Table 2), where we focus on the interplay between risk aversion and a set of indicator 
variables that correspond to the relevant time windows found in the graphical analysis. We 
built three indicator variables that collapse the time periods, as signaled by the constant 
periods in the cumulative Aalen estimator. The results of this approach can be found in the 
second row of Table 2 (model E). As one can see, no economically or statistically relevant 
effect can be found in this specification. 
 
Table 2: Models considering time-dependence of the risk aversion coefficient 
about here 
 
In set of additional modeling approaches, we used a multipolynomial specification of time 
dependence, in which career risk aversion interacts with a linear, squared and cubic term of 
time (measured in months) which can be found in Table 2 (model F). In model G and H, this 
approach is extended by a fourth order polynomial specification of time. What we find in our 
approaches is a clear evidence for our hypothesis of time dependence of risk aversion in 
affecting unemployment durations. In more detail, the findings in model F imply that the effect 
of risk aversion first tends to increase, then decreases and finally increases again. Using the 
related parameter estimates, we will find the maximum point of inflexion at t = 10, while the 
minimum is around 29 months. As further robustness checks show (see model H), 
insignificance of the fourth order polynomial depends on missing support in the combination 
of time and risk aversion in the upper range (high-risk aversion in the upper tail of the 
process time). Excluding related observations (risk aversion above 9 and above 33 months 
of observation) leads to better fit of the statistical modeling and shows that a fourth-order 
polynomial correlation seems to be strongly plausible.   16
Evaluation of non-linear and time depending effects: simulations 
Nevertheless, two points remain unsatisfying so far. Up to now, support has been given to 
both of our hypotheses, the non-linear (squared) effect and the time dependency of career 
risk aversion in affecting the likelihood to end up with unemployment. The second point is 
that polynomial specifications are rather complex and do not reveal a clear picture of the net 
effect. Accordingly, the contributions to the change of the hazard rate or the time scaling 
effects are far from being understandable without including the baseline function and 
transforming these results into a more tangible picture. 
We therefore simulated survival estimates in order to asses both effects that are supported 
by our empirical analysis. However, instead of using a gamma model specification for the 
simulation we refer to the lognormal distribution (since H0: kappa = 0 can be not be rejected 
on the common level of statistical significance). The results of this investigation are displayed 
in Figure 4. This graphical illustration displays the simulated survival function (y-axis) across 
time (x-axis) and in reference to career risk aversion (z-axis).
9 The upper graph (see (a)) 
shows the simulated values based on the non-linear (squared) specification of the risk 
measure, while the two lower graphs (see (b) and (c)) correspond to the time varying 
specification ((b): covering a fourth and (c) including a third order polynomial term). 
 
Figure 4: Survival estimates based on non-linear and time-dependant effects 
about here 
 
Following the discussion above, three explanations of the nature of risk aversion in affecting 
unemployment duration can be taken into account. First, the survival function of the upper 
graph ((a)) reveals only a smooth squared effect in survival. The estimates would therefore 
support a lower hazard from unemployment for the very high and the very low risk averse 
people, while middle risk aversion leads to a much quicker departure from unemployment. 
Focusing on the middle picture (see (b)), our estimates support the assertion that the 
probability of remaining unemployed across time (here: survival in unemployment) follows a 
smooth but strongly monotone pattern for low values of risk aversion. Furthermore, this 
pattern converges to a monotone step-like shape with the presence of two saddle points for 
the very high-risk averse population. In an extreme case of risk aversion, our prediction 
reveals that, in periods between 0 to 3 and 18 to 22, we would almost expect a constant rate 
                                                  
9 For the simulation we refer to a reference (mean-median) person which is male, 41 years old, having no partner 
and no children, being formally trained (apprenticeship), with unemployment experience before, an monthly net 
income of 2150 Euro and having a previous working context averaged context specific unemployment 
durations (see Table  A2).   17
of probability of remaining unemployed (share of survivors). In the lower graphical illustration 
(see (c)), which addresses a third order polynomial specification, this step-like pattern in the 
survival function would be less pronounced and is more like an inverted s-shaped function. 
Here we find a strong decrease in the survival function for the high risk scores between the 
12
th and the 20
th month of unemployment which reflects a high tendency to stop searching. In 
general, the illustration (b) and (c) show that the higher the risk aversions the more sensitve 
people react on the elapsing time in quitting unemployment. 
Nevertheless, all survival estimates emphasize that, with an increase in risk aversion, we 
must expect an increase in the share of individuals who remain unemployed. We take this as 
an indication of the rejection of the hypothesis that unemployment hazards increase with risk 
aversion and that highly risk-averse people tend to accept job offers more quickly. This 
picture contradicts to what is found in earlier studies. Furthermore, support is given for the 
hypothesis that a subsequent risk premium is unlikely to be linearly related to the period 
spent for searching – or alternatively that time variation may be present in the individual’s 
utility function. 
To assess the most likely nature of the correlation of risk aversion with unemployment 
duration, we refer to two simple indicators. First, focusing on the entropy of the statistical 
models, we have sufficient evidence that the fourth polynomial description of risk aversion in 
affecting unemployment duration is better than the squared or the third order polynomial 
description. However, testing the time dependence of the effect, the squared nature of risk 
aversion in affecting duration reveals that the effect is linear across time. A graphical 
assessment of this investigation is displayed in Figure 3 (graph two on the right hand side), 
which shows that an effect that includes a linear and a non-linear squared effect diminishes 
the potential time varying effect of risk aversion. Unfortunately, a specific test that allows us 




Finally, it is worth noting some robustness checks we conducted to test whether our findings 
depend on certain specifications in our analysis. As a first step, we examined the stability of 
the results using different measurements for risk aversion. The background of this procedure 
refers to the context that risk aversion has no natural meaning, or no point of reference, and 
that measures may be affected by the individual’s perspective of the measuring risk aversion.  
In addition, because the GSOEP is a panel survey, it may suffer from issues with panel 
attrition. We therefore reran all analyses, including a weighting scheme that controls for 
panel mortality and that also includes the censoring of historical information. Furthermore, we   18
also conducted all analyses based on a sample that is less restrictive in its population. In the 
robustness checks, we allowed our population to have at least 10 months of employment, not 
12 months as used above, to avoid endogenous correlations related to the effect of risk 
aversion. 
Further objections may relate to the definition of unemployment. For example, unemployed 
individuals with very short episodes may be more likely to already be focusing on specific job 
offers, or may already have signed a new contract. This is a strong concern because such 
issues may bias our estimation due to unobserved heterogeneity that may also potentially 
correlate with risk aversion. We therefore removed all individuals with only one month of 
unemployment and re-defined the second month as month one. To some extent, this should 
also account for concerns that are indicated by Jürgens (2004), who reports that up to one 
quarter of the reported periods in the GSOEP may be subject to measurement errors. 
To sum up, none of our checks reveals substantial differences from the results that we 
discussed above. Detailed information on each single check is available from the authors. 
 
5 Summary and Discussion 
 
Addressing the deficit in research on the influence of risk aversion on unemployment 
duration, we used German micro data that allowed us to measure individuals’ risk aversion 
based on a direct, context specific measurement. Following search theory, reservation 
wages should be lower for risk-averse individuals, and therefore influence the expected 
duration of search, which we identify as the time spent in unemployment. To confirm this 
finding, we proofed different types of modeling approaches that controlled for unobserved 
heterogeneity and conducted different robustness checks.  
Our results show that when considering time dependent patterns in the hazard alone, we did 
not find support for the thesis that risk aversion causes shorter (or longer) unemployment 
durations. However, we found significant effects when considering the non-linearity and time 
variation of the effect of risk aversion on unemployment duration. This is a clear support to 
reject the presence of a linear interrelation between risk aversion, risk premium and the job 
search process. In more detail, we found that risk aversion is either inversely u-shaped in its 
correlation with unemployment duration (u-shaped with leaving unemployment) or that risk 
aversion differs in its effect on unemployment duration, depending on the elapsed time. 
We interpret this finding as a support for a non-monotonic or time variant relation of risk 
aversion in the individual’s utility in the context of job search. In our view this supports a more 
complex interrelation between risk aversion and utility than traditionally emphasized. 
Therefore, the core finding of this study is in our opinion that our results contribute to a better   19
understanding of the role of risk aversion in the search process and that it offers questions 
for further research in the subject of job search. In particular, time variation and non-linearity 
in this context had not been observed so far. Furthermore, the simulation of the time 
depending risk of remaining unemployed reveals that risk aversion in its more complex 
modeling approach does refer to a reduction of the expected unemployment duration as it is 
previously found in empirical studies (Feinberg 1977). Instead we find that the risk of 
remaining unemployed slightly tends to increase with risk aversion – particularly in extreme 
cases of risk aversion. 
However, a shortcoming of our research concerns a missing differentiation of time variant 
and non-linear nexus between risk aversion and unemployment hazards. Evidence, of which 
effect refers to the nature of the correlation between risk aversion and unemployment 
duration, if it is even possible to be disentangled, remains unclear. Therefore, further 
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Table 1: Models considering risk aversion in a non-linear way 
 
      
  model A  model B  model C  model D 
Variables      
      
male 0,072  0,049  0,022  0,03 
age  0,064*** 0,064*** 0,064*** 0,064*** 
household  -0,389*** -0,397*** -0,403*** -0,403*** 
partner -0,389*  -0,390*  -0,414**  -0,407* 
children  -0,197* -0,198* -0,191* -0,196* 
training -0,345**  -0,324**  -0,310*  -0,309* 
unemployed before  0,157  0,164  0,157  0,16 
employment  history  -0,349 -0,378 -0,357 -0,377 
wage  before  -0,000**  -0,000* -0,000* -0,000* 
mean ue in occupation  0,162*  0,160*  0,153*  0,156* 
mean ue in industry  0,003  0,011  0,013  0,012 
mean ue in the group of 
firm size  0,003 0,011 0,013 0,012 
accept lower wages  -0,553***  -0,548***  -0,557***  -0,554*** 
worries about the future  -0,119  -0,121  -0,126  -0,125 
career risk score  -0,023    -0,166**  -0,101 
career risk score 
(dummies) )
1      
gr 1    0,142     
gr 2  reference 
gr 3    -0,099     
gr 4    -0,173     
gr 5    0,017     
career risk score sq.      0,017**  -0,001 
career risk score cubic        0,001 
constant 1,104  1,079  1,315*  1,299* 
ln sigma  0,014  0,016  0,023  0,02 
ln  kappa  0,274 0,263 0,225 0,241 
      
N  4227 4227 4227 4227 
quits  306 306 306 306 
ll -558,808  -557,385  -556,225  -556,1 
chi2  111,957 114,803 117,123 117,372 
aic 1153,616  1156,769  1150,45  1152,201 
bic  1267,902 1290,103 1271,085 1279,185 
      
Notes:  
GSOEP, own calculations; “ue” stands for the term unemployment 
estimation results base on a gamma distributed duration model (AFT-metric) 
)
1 category 1 (gr 1) = risk values 0 to 2; category 2 = risk values 3 and 4; category 4 = risk values 5 to 8; 
category 5 = risk aversion values 9 and 10 
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Table 2: Models considering time-dependence of the risk aversion coefficient 
 
      











Variables      
      
male  0,088 0,058 0,049 0,058 
age  0,060*** 0,050*** 0,048*** 0,049*** 
household  -0,359*** -0,289*** -0,279*** -0,297*** 
partner  -0,346*  -0,239 -0,235 -0,201 
children  -0,194* -0,152* -0,144* -0,140* 
training -0,324**  -0,261**  -0,248**  -0,195* 
unemployed before  0,139  0,1  0,094  0,098 
employment  history  -0,332 -0,244 -0,233 -0,335 
wage before  -0,000**  -0,000*  -0,000*  0 
mean ue in occupation  0,150*  0,130*  0,129*  0,121* 
mean ue in industry  0,003  0,007  0,009  0 
mean ue in the group of 
firm  size  -0,147 -0,105 -0,101 -0,113 
accept lower wages  -0,523***  -0,443***  -0,432***  -0,434*** 
worries about the future  -0,107  -0,097  -0,093  -0,094 
career risk score    -0,152***  -0,184***  -0,222*** 
interaction between risk 
score and time (month)         
risk * t(0-7)  -0,036*       
risk * t(8-18; > 22)  0,008       
risk * t(19-22)  0,028       
risk * t(linear)    0,049***  0,076***  0,084*** 
risk * t(squared)    -0,003***  -0,008**  -0,009*** 
risk * t(cubic)    0,000**  0  0,000*** 
risk * t(4th order)      0  -0,000** 
constant   1,252*  1,108*  1,063*  1,340** 
ln sigma  -0,075  -0,186**  -0,189**  -0,268*** 
ln  kappa  0,410*  0,138 0,048 0,315 
      
N  4227 4227 4227 4119 
quits  306 306 306 302 
ll  -556,875 -547,851 -546,542 -531,348 
chi2 115,823  133,871  136,488  142,98 
aic  1153,749 1137,701 1137,084 1106,697 
bic  1280,734 1271,036 1276,768 1245,811 
      
Notes:  
GSOEP, own calculations; “ue” stands for the term unemployment 
estimation results base on a gamma distributed duration model (AFT-metric) 
)
1 In the model H we restrict the estimation on a subsample that does not include the upper tail of duration and risk 
aversion (observations with long unemployment durations and high risk scores) because of limited support in order 
to achieve more robust results. 
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Figure 4: Survival estimates based on non-linear and time-dependant effects 
 
(a) 
 analysis time (months)      0,000     35,823
 survival
    0,051
    0,986
 risk score
    10,000
     0,000
 
(b) 
 analysis time (months)      0,884     35,795
 survival
    0,000
    0,991
 risk score
    10,000
     0,000
 
(c) 
 analysis time (months)      0,884     35,795
 survival
    0,004
    0,991
 risk score
    10,000
     0,000
 
Notes: GSOEP, own calculations 
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Appendix 
 





Personal characteristics   
Male  Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the individual is a male and zero otherwise. 
Age  Metric variable measuring age. 
Household  Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the individual is living in a household and zero 
otherwise. 
Partner  Dummy variable that signals whether there is a married partner in the household or in the 
presence of a cohabite he or she is living with and zero otherwise. 
Children  Dummy variable that takes the value of one if children are living in the household and zero 
otherwise. 
Human capital   
Training  Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the individual has finished formal training 
(apprenticeship or university) and zero otherwise. 
Labor market history   
Unemployment before  Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the individual has been unemployed in 2002 
or 2003 and zero otherwise. 
Employment history  Metric variable that is defined as the share of months in employment over the last five years 
before 2004 and the total time of observation in this period. 
Wage before  Metric variables that is defined as the average net monthly wage income in the last five years 
before 2004. 
Contextual characteristics   
Mean unemployment (ue) 
in occupation 
Metric variable that is defined as the average of monthly unemployment periods by 
occupation. For this measurement, we used the total population in the GSOEP between an 
ages of 20 and 60 and focus on the two digit classification of occupations). 
Kurtosis of ue in 
occupation  Metric variable; see Mean ue in occupation – instead of the mean we used the kurtosis. 
Mean ue in industry  Metric variable; see Mean ue in occupation – instead of the occupation we focus on the two 
digit industry classification (NACE) 
Kurtosis of ue in industry  Metric variable; see Mean ue in industry – instead of the mean we used the kurtosis. 
Mean ue in group of firm 
size 
Metric variable; see Mean ue in occupation – instead of the occupations we focused on 
classification of the firm size measured by the number of employees (1-<5; 5-<20; 20-u200; 
200-<2000; >=2000). 
Kurtosis of ue in group of 
firm size  Metric variable; see Mean ue in firm – instead of the mean we used the kurtosis. 
Personality   
Accept lower wages 
Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the individual is willing to accept a lower 
wage to find a job. We identify this by using the (self-reported) information about the 
monthly salary at which the individual would take a job using waves 2005 and 2006 in 
reference to the average income he or she received in 2003 and 2004. The variable is one 
only if the difference between the reported reservation wage and the average income is 
positive and if the difference is greater than on standard deviation of the population 
difference and is zero otherwise. 
Worries about the future 
Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the individual states that he worries about 
economic development or if the states that he worries about his or her personal finances and 
zero otherwise. 
Risk score 
Variable between zero and ten based on the question of how much an individual is willing to 
take risks in their occupation. A value of zero indicates that the individual is not willing to 
take risks. A value of 10 signals the highest level of willingness to accept risks. 
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics 
 
       
Variables Obs  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Min Max 
       
risk score  472  4,06  2,60  0  10 
male 472  0,53  0,50  0  1 
age 472  41,88  11,81  22  62 
household 472  0,69  0,46  0  1 
partner 472  0,09  0,29  0  1 
children 472  0,40  0,49  0  1 
training 472  0,85  0,36  0  1 
unemployed before  472  0,15  0,36  0  1 
employment history  472  0,07  0,15  0  0,86 
children 472  0,85  0,21  0,05  1 
wage before  472  2106  1332  160  9880 
mean ue in occupation  472  4,56  0,69  2,25  6,50 
kurtosis of ue in occup.  472  2,70  0,68  1,48  5,13 
mean ue in industry  472  4,59  0,69  2,37  6,24 
kurtosis of ue in ind.  472  2,70  0,57  1,00  4,23 
mean ue in the group of 
firm  size  472 4,50 0,44 4,26 6,15 
kurtosis of ue in the group 
of firm size  472  2,81  0,31  1,82  3,10 
accept lower wages  472  0,53  0,50  0  1 
worries about the future  472  0,69  0,46  0  1 
       
Notes:  
GSOEP, own calculations; “ue” stands for the term unemployment   31
Table A3: Table of correlations 
 
              
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
              
risk  score  (1)  1,000             
male  (2)  0,088  1,000            
age  (3)  -0,200  -0,026  1,000           
household  (4)  -0,046  0,117  0,237  1,000          
partner  (5)  0,163  -0,089  -0,189 -0,474 1,000         
children  (6)  -0,054 0,101 -0,124 0,101 -0,012 1,000             
training (7)  0,142  0,033  -0,019 0,056  -0,046 0,002  1,000       
unemployed  
before (8)  0,043 0,003 -0,098 -0,091 -0,031 0,069  -0,022 1,000      
employment  
history (9)  -0,094 0,089 0,338 0,257 -0,085 -0,086 0,089 -0,468 1,000       
wage  before  (10)  0,115 0,282 0,327 0,256 -0,148 -0,133 0,077 -0,113 0,358 1,000     
accept lower  
wages (11)  -0,184 -0,033 0,798 0,217 -0,137 -0,074 0,039 -0,182 0,369 0,278 1,000   
worries about  
the future (12)  -0,056 0,076 0,062 -0,021 -0,052 0,060 0,058 0,088 -0,030 0,015 0,112 1,000 
              
              
              
              
              
  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21)       
              
risk  score  (13)  1,000             
male  (14)  0,088  1,000            
age  (15)  -0,200  -0,026  1,000           
mean ue in  
occupation (16)  -0,133  -0,208  0,064  1,000          
kurtosis of ue in  
occup. (17)  0,110  0,107  -0,043 -0,523 1,000         
mean ue in  
industry (18)  -0,011  -0,121  0,048  0,359  -0,243 1,000        
kurtosis of ue  
in ind. (19)  0,002  0,100  -0,030 -0,209 0,273  -0,730 1,000       
mean ue in the group of 
firm size (20)  -0,022 0,039 -0,037 0,404 -0,216 0,394  -0,276 1,000      
kurtosis of ue in the 
group of firm size (21)  0,015 -0,033 0,023 -0,358 0,195 -0,304 0,216 -0,958 1,000       
              
Notes:  
GSOEP, own calculations; “ue” stands for the term unemployment   32
Table A4: Alternative model specifications and estimation results  
 
               
  M0  M1  M2 M3 M4  M5  M6  M7 
  (gamma)  (logn;gamma)  (cox)  (clog; t cat.)  (clog; t)  (clog;logt)  (clog; polyt)  (clog;baseline) 
  AFT AFT  Hazard  Discrete  Discrete  Discrete  Discrete  Discrete 
Variables                
                
career risk score  -0,023  -0,022 0,025 0,029 0,028  0,028  0,028  0,028 
male 0,072  0,035  -0,192  -0,213  -0,207 -0,210*  -0,207  -0,208 
age 0,064***  0,064***  -0,068***  -0,076***  -0,072*** -0,072***  -0,072***  -0,072*** 
household -0,389***  -0,397***  0,399** 0,445***  0,414*** 0,414***  0,418***  0,414*** 
partner -0,389*  -0,390*  0,390* 0,449* 0,424*  0,424*  0,424*  0,423* 
children -0,197*  -0,163  0,301** 0,331***  0,323*** 0,325***  0,325***  0,324*** 
training -0,345**  -0,327**  0,394** 0,430** 0,409**  0,413**  0,408**  0,411** 
unemployed before  0,157  0,162  -0,155  -0,169 -0,164  -0,164  -0,168  -0,164 
employment history  -0,349  -0,297 0,423 0,479 0,437  0,447  0,428  0,442 
wage before  -0,000**  -0,000*  0,000** 0,000** 0,000**  0,000**  0,000**  0,000** 
mean ue in occupation  0,162*  0,161*  -0,16 -0,182*  -0,175* -0,176* -0,174*  -0,175* 
mean ue in industry  0,003  -0,006  -0,028 -0,029 -0,022  -0,023  -0,022  -0,022 
mean ue in the group of 
firm size  -0,152  -0,13  0,233 0,259 0,244  0,246  0,241  0,245 
accept lower wages  -0,553***  -0,545*** 0,613*** 0,706*** 0,663***  0,668***  0,663***  0,665*** 
worries about the future  -0,119  -0,129 0,073 0,084 0,083  0,082  0,085  0,083 
constant 1,104  0,904    -1,461  -1,560* -1,566*  -1,546*  -1,620* 
               
ln  sigma  0,014  0,065          
ln  kappa  0,274            
ln  theta   -15,635            
               
t (dummies)        yes         
t (linear)          -0,002       
t  (log)          -0,002     
t  (squared)            -0,001   
t  (cubic)            0   
t (4th order polynomial)              0   
t (baseline specification)                0,612 
             
N 4227  4227  4227  4174*  4227  4227  4227  4227 
quits  306  306  306 306 306  306  306  306 
ll -558,808  -559,784  -1617,06  -1005,89  -1026,75 -1026,771 -1026,671  -1026,76 
chi2 111,957  114,582  114,67  176,403 142,707  142,658  142,856  142,678 
aic 1153,62  1155,57  3264,12  2099,78 2087,49 2087,541 2091,342  2087,521 
bic 1267,9  1269,86  3359,36  2378,59 2195,43 2195,479 2211,978  2195,458 
               
Notes:  
GSOEP, own calculations 
estimation results base on a gamma distributed duration model (AFT-metric) 
* uses fewer observations due to perfect predictions of the upper tail in duration  
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